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Abstract There exists a range of situations where non-state actors and states can
possibly share responsibility for their contribution to harmful outcomes, thereby
raising a multitude of questions on the determination, content and implementation
of responsibility in such a scenario. It may be tempting to adopt an approach
whereby a shared responsibility regime involving non-state actors and states draws
ex post on the regime put in place by the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, especially in connection to the rules of attribution of
conduct and attribution of responsibility. Such a model of international responsi-
bility, however, would only work to the extent that addressees are bound by primary
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norms of international law in the first place. This is certainly not a given in respect
of non-state actors. Moreover, non-state actors may differ fundamentally from
states, thereby making the transposition of traditional rules of state responsibility
artificial and inadequate: their loosely organised, temporary, diverse, illegitimate, or
even outright criminal character may militate against applying the classic respon-
sibility paradigm to non-state-state interactions. In view of these limitations, a turn
to an ex ante approach to questions of shared responsibility, through standard-
setting, has been suggested, and may be cautiously supported in respect of the
activities of a number of non-state actors. This, however, is not exclusive to the
simultaneous application of ex post and ex ante approaches to shared responsibility.
Keywords Shared responsibility  International law  Non-state actors  States 
Wrongful acts  Harmful outcomes  Primary obligations  Standard-setting
1 Context: Non-State Actors and Responsibility
The present contribution forms the introduction to a symposium on the question
whether and how international responsibility for harmful outcomes is, or should be,
shared between non-state actors and states. Apart from this introduction, the
symposium consists of four articles, that address respectively the question of shared
responsibility from the angle of armed opposition groups;1 multinational enterpris-
es;2 private security companies;3 and non-state terrorist actors.4
Questions of the responsibility of non-state actors, such as corporations, armed
groups, and non-governmental organisations, have long been on the agenda of both
policy-makers and international lawyers. It has increasingly been accepted, in the
second half of the 20th century, that non-state actors are, or should be, the bearers of
international legal obligations. Amplified by regular findings that such obligations
are disregarded, demands that legal consequences—especially in terms of respon-
sibility—should be attached to such violations have become more pressing.5 In the
same vein, the harm which such non-state actors can cause, irrespective of their
international obligations, has generated expectations that international law addresses
the actions that cause such harm, as well as attaches reparative consequences
thereto.
The conceptual and practical difficulties with which policy-makers and
international lawyers have been confronted in their attempt to deal with such
demands are well known. First, the frameworks of responsibility, which have been
designed to address the wrongful conduct of states and international organisations,
can only capture a limited part of the conduct of non-state actors which constitutes
violations of international law. Likewise, the dominant breach-based approach to





5 See for a discussion Gal-Or et al. (2015).
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harmful actions of non-state actors which do not constitute a breach of international
legal obligations. What is more, the impugned forms of conduct of non-state
actors—whether or not constituting a breach of their obligations—have proved to be
complex and composite practices as they often involve the contribution or
participation of other actors, including states (and international organisations).
Impugned actions by non-state actors rarely fall short of any state (or international
organisation’s) involvement. They are multi-dimensional from a ratione personae
perspective.
2 Object and Conceptual Premises of the Symposium: Shared
Responsibility, Accountability, Regulation and Organised Non-State
Actors
It is against this backdrop that this symposium seeks to provide new insights into the
responsibility of non-state actors, especially when their impugned conduct involves,
to a larger or lesser extent, acts or omissions of states.6 That is, it focusses on
situations where a multiplicity of actors contribute towards a single harmful
outcome that is not causally divisible. The questions of responsibility examined here
can thus be—broadly speaking—qualified as questions of shared responsibility.7 For
the sake of this symposium, such shared responsibility is envisaged irrespective of
whether the actors in question act in concert or independently.
While the symposium does tackle the question whether non-state actors act in
breach of international obligations, it takes a broader view and also considers harmful
actions by non-state actors in conjunction with states, irrespective of whether these
actions constitute a breach of an international obligation by either one of them. The
situations examined are thus not only approached from the perspective of shared
responsibility stricto sensu but also from the vantage point of shared accountability.
The notion of shared accountability refers to situations where multiple actors are held
accountable for a certain conduct without this conduct necessarily giving rise to
responsibility in the formal and breach-based understanding of the term in
international law. Determinations of accountability may for instance be based on
standards that apply to non-state actors, but that are not binding as a matter of
international law. Accordingly, the conceptual framework within which the question
of the shared responsibility of non-state actors is addressed departs from the
traditional—and mainstream—law of international responsibility. This departure was
considered necessary, as the traditional framework cannot adequately regulate, and
ensure accountability for, non-state actors acting in conjunction with states.
Because this symposium grapples with situations where harmful outcomes do not
necessarily result from an internationally wrongful act, authors have been invited to
espouse not only a traditional, ex post, international responsibility perspective, but
6 This symposium does not examine specifically situations where impugned actions involve international
organisations, although the findings made in the following contributions will generally apply to those
situations as well.
7 See for the conceptual framework for shared responsibility: Nollkaemper and Jacobs (2013).
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also a harm—and victim—oriented approach. The latter approach has two
dimensions: regulation and accountability. Regulation here pertains to norm-setting
processes where one or more actors (whether unilaterally, or through discussions
and negotiations with others) agree on standards limiting their scope of action, and
allocate ‘responsibility’ (in an ex ante meaning) to each other with a view to
preventing harmful outcomes from materialising. Accountability pertains to the
extent to which non-state actors, possibly alongside other actors, are subject to
scrutiny and compliance-monitoring with respect to agreed standards, whether or
not such standards are legally binding and could thus lead to responsibility. In
essence, a non-state actor’s accountability refers to an obligation to answer to other
actors for its conduct in the light of predetermined review standards.8 Such
standards may also include legitimate normative expectations of the international
community, an extension that allows us to include in the regulation and
accountability paradigm situations of non-state actors contributing to harm without
being bound by norms of international law, e.g., armed opposition groups or
transnational corporations committing human rights abuses that may technically not
constitute violations of international human rights law due to the claimed duty-
bearer’s lack of legal personality.9
This symposium is eventually predicated on the idea that those non-state actors
which exercise some form of public authority and whose action may lead to harmful
actions at the international level are usually entities endowed with a relatively
integrated and formal structure. Short of an integrated and formal structure, such
actors rarely engage in the collective harmful actions which are examined here. This
is why throughout this symposium the focus is on organised non-state actors.10
8 Compare International Law Association (ILA), Committee on the Accountability of International
Organisations, Final Conference Report Berlin 2004, in which the Committee considers, in respect of
international organisations, that ‘accountability… consists of three levels which are interrelated and
mutually supportive: [First level] the extent to which international Organisations, in the fulfilment of their
functions are established in their constituent instruments, are and should be subject to, or should exercise,
forms of internal and external scrutiny and monitoring, irrespective of potential and subsequent liability
and/or responsibility; [Second level] tortious liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts or
omissions not involving a breach of any rule of international and/or institutional law (e.g., environmental
damage as a result of lawful nuclear or space activities); [Third level] responsibility arising out of acts or
omissions which do constitute a breach of a rule of international and/or institutional law (e.g., violations
of human rights or humanitarian law, breach of contract, gross negligence…)’, see p 5.
9 See as far as armed groups are concerned: ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions, Mission to Sri Lanka’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5 (27 March 2006), paras.
25–27, holding that armed groups’ human rights records are subject to the ‘legitimate expectations of the
international community’; armed groups must therefore ‘accept that insofar as they aspire to represent a
people before the world, the international community will evaluate their conduct according to the
Universal Declaration’s ‘‘common standard of achievement’’’. See as far as transnational corporations are
concerned: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Ruggie J, ‘Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’’ Framework’, UN
Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011), with commentary, Commentary to Principle 11: ‘The [corporate]
responsibility to respect human rights is a global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises
wherever they operate’.
10 International (intergovernmental) organisations are not considered as organised non-state actors for the
sake of this article.
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Some formal and structural integration is taken as a prerequisite for the questions of
responsibility addressed in this symposium to arise. This being said, compared to
states and international organisations, the organised character of non-state actors
remains relative. Notably some armed groups have a rudimentary structure.
Moreover, non-state actors’ organised character need not be permanent. Indeed, it is
often the case that non-state actors such as terrorist or armed opposition groups, or
even private military companies, are only temporary creatures. It will be shown that
the organised character of the non-state actors involved in the situations examined
here comes with specific problems with respect to (shared) responsibility, e.g., in
terms of attribution and reparation.11
3 Sharing Responsibility and Its Practical Relevance
While situations giving rise to the question of shared responsibility between non-
state actors and states are certainly not a textbook case, it is not difficult to mention,
at this preliminary stage, a range of situations where the question of sharing
responsibility can prove pressing. The frequency as well as the likelihood of non-
state actors contributing to harmful outcomes in conjunction with states can be
illustrated by the following scenarios: (1) a joint failure of corporations and states to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which results in environmental degradation and
social uprooting through climate change; (2) human rights abuses committed by
private military companies to which states have delegated powers; (3) acts of piracy
committed by pirates whose acts are condoned or encouraged by (failed) states;
(4) violations of economic and social rights committed by public/private partner-
ships in the energy sector (e.g., through a failure to guarantee the right to water);
(5) investors or rating agencies influencing states to take certain decisions that have
an adverse impact on the enjoyment of human rights or the protection of the
environment; (6) multinational corporations active in the extractive industry sector
providing material assistance to repressive governments in order to secure the
profitability of mining concessions. In most of these situations, international
standards—sometimes of a legally binding nature—are applicable, thereby opening
the possibility of responsibility or accountability processes.
4 Legal and Conceptual Limitations of Mainstream Frameworks
As was already alluded to above, establishing the responsibility of non-state actors
has proved to be a thorny issue, even more so if such responsibility can possibly be
shared with states or other actors. Indeed, international law, at least according to the
dominant understanding thereof, does not provide a tailored framework on the basis
of which non-state actors may be held responsible for contributions to a harmful
outcome—whether alone or in conjunction with other actors. This is mainly so
because, according to mainstream frameworks of sources and responsibility, it is
11 See notably the contribution of Bı´lkova´ (2015), Section 2.
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unclear to what extent non-state actors bear obligations under international law, and
how responsibility is shared among multiple actors (including states and interna-
tional organisations).12 As a background to the symposium, these difficulties must
be briefly recalled here.
Technically speaking, many non-state actors cannot commit internationally
wrongful acts which could give rise to their responsibility, for they are not bound by
primary norms of international law to begin with. Uncertainty shrouding the binding
character of international law for non-state actors explains why one will often
naturally try to channel responsibility under the—more classical—frameworks of
the responsibility of states on the basis of attribution of the conduct of non-state
actors to states, state failure to take proper measures to prevent wrongful non-state
conduct, or—more theoretically—attribution of the responsibility of the non-state
actor to the state. The International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)13 give pride
of place to the principles governing the attribution of the conduct of non-state actors
to states in Articles 5–11, imputing such conduct to states in case of a close
proximity between the latter and non-state actor action (e.g., in case a non-state
actor exercises elements of governmental authority, or in case a state directs or
controls the conduct of a non-state actor). Some primary norms of international law
also provide for a state duty to protect against, or to exercise due diligence in respect
of, harmful activities by non-state actors, notably in the human rights and
environmental field.14 These different routes, however, may prove inconclusive as
the conditions for the attribution of the conduct of non-state actors to states are
rather strict, and the conditions for the application of the obligations of states to
exercise due diligence in relation to non-state actors may not be met. The same
holds true for the mechanism of attribution of responsibility.
Therefore, it will often be difficult—or outright impossible—to capture situations
involving non-state actor misconduct through the traditional channels of state
responsibility. It is traditionally found that a relaxation of the standards of
attribution of conduct may dangerously conflate the distinction between the public
and private sphere, and bring about an unwarranted expansion of the scope of
12 Nollkaemper and Plakokefalos (2014), p. 341.
13 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC Yearbook 2001/II(2)
(ARSIWA).
14 See in the human rights field, e.g., Osman v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94 (ECtHR, 28
October 1998) Reports 1998-VIII, paras. 115–116. See also Ilas¸cu and others v. Moldova and Russia,
App. No. 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004) Reports 2004-VII, [GC], paras. 330–331; Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43, para. 430 (Bosnian Genocide); ‘Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘‘Protect, Respect and
Remedy’’ Framework’, Principle 1. In the field of environmental law see Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, 14, para.193; Responsibilities and Obligations of
States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, Seabed
Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 February 2011,
(2011) 50 ILM 458, paras.110, 117–20.
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responsibility.15 That said, such resistance is sometimes contested. Indeed, from an
accountability perspective, strict standards, e.g., the requirement of ‘effective
control’ of a state over a non-state actor’s conduct, may give rise to accountability
gaps in case non-state actors operate at sufficient arm’s length from states, even
when being factually engaged in joint enterprises with them.16 Such accountability
gaps may similarly be witnessed in case states (such as failed states) do not have the
capacity to influence non-state actor activity and thus are not in a position to take
protective measures.17 Such gaps may notably manifest themselves where states do
not control the territory on which the non-state actors are active, or when states have
no economic links with the non-state actors that offer them leverage to steer their
conduct into a desirable direction. It is this accountability agenda that invites
international lawyers to reflect upon the possibility of a more autonomous
framework to hold non-state actors responsible for their own action, and to relate
such responsibility to the responsibility of states and other actors. The various
contributions to this symposium all share such an accountability agenda. They are,
to a greater or lesser extent, articulated around the search for an improvement of
regulation and accountability mechanisms with respect to the potential harmful
actions of non-state actors, especially when these have been acting in conjunction
with states.
Difficulties faced by policy-makers and international lawyers as to holding non-
state actors responsible, possibly together with states, are not only of a substantive
nature. There are also strong procedural obstacles in holding those actors
responsible, stemming from the limited jurisdictional remit of international and
national dispute-settlement mechanisms. As a result of these limitations, combined
with the above-mentioned uncertainty as to the international obligations of non-state
actors, there is limited practice as far as shared responsibility between non-state
actors and other actors is concerned. Only some occasional instances of dispute-
settlement mechanisms addressing the question of shared responsibility between
non-state actors and states can be gleaned. One such rather exceptional situation is
litigation in United States federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute,18 which
private plaintiffs have relied on to bring cases against multinational corporations for
violations of international law, typically alleging the latter’s complicity in
internationally wrongful acts committed by states. In some cases it was implied
that non-state actors and states could share responsibility on the basis of the former
aiding and assisting the latter in committing internationally wrongful acts.19
Ultimately, however, these cases have had little relevance for the question of shared
15 Compare Bosnian Genocide, para. 406 (ruling, with respect to Art. 8 ARSIWA, that ‘the ‘‘overall
control’’ test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the connection which must
exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its international responsibility’).
16 See the contribution of Trapp (2015), Section 3.1, where she advocates a relaxation of the effective
control standard when it comes to attributing conduct of terrorist groups to states.
17 See the contribution of Trapp (2015), Section 3.2.
18 Alien Tort Statute, 28 USC § 1350.
19 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (Kiobel) is, again, a good example, where
the plaintiffs suggested that the corporation in question had aided and abetted Nigeria in violating human
rights, see Karavias (2015), Section 4.
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responsibility under international law. Apart from the fact that many of these cases
have ended in a settlement between the plaintiffs and the corporations, for immunity
reasons the state was not a party to the proceedings, thus obviating the need for US
judges to examine issues of shared responsibility. Moreover, some US courts
doubted whether corporations had international obligations in the first place, thus
foreclosing the path towards responsibility.20
Situations of shared responsibility involving non-state actors may exceptionally
arise, however, pursuant to specific institutional regimes, notably where states have
empowered non-state actors to carry out certain activities. The field of economic
activities carried out on the international seabed or ‘Area’ is a case in point. Under
the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),21 corporations
can enter into an international contract for the exploration of polymetallic nodules,
and accordingly incur obligations and responsibility under international law. In its
2011 Advisory Opinion, the Seabed Chamber of the International Tribunal of the
Law of the Sea appeared to acknowledge the possibility of multiple actors sharing
responsibility under the LOSC, where it held that ‘[j]oint and several liability arises
where different entities have contributed to the same damage so that full reparation
can be claimed from all or any of them.’22 While the Chamber may only have
referred to responsibility shared between states and international organisations, it is
arguable that also corporations, on the basis of the contract, may share responsibility
for wrongful acts in breach of the contract. However, even if this were the case, this
shared responsibility does not exist as a matter of general international law, but
follows the existence of the contractual obligations.23
All in all, the specific instances where questions of the responsibility of non-state
actors, as well as of its shared responsibility with states, have been raised in
adjudication remain rather limited or inconclusive. This is why it has not been
possible to draw from existing practice any general conclusions as to the shared
responsibility of non-state actors. It is the aim of this symposium to go beyond the
20 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2nd Cir. 2010); Doe v. Nestle, 748 F.
Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010). The chances of US courts examining issues of shared responsibility
between organised non-state actors and states has been even further diminished after the US Supreme
Court’s decision in Kiobel, which severely circumscribed the jurisdictional ambit of the Alien Tort Statute
by, relying on the presumption against extraterritoriality, barring relief for violations of the law of nations
occurring outside the United States under the Alien Tort Statute, requiring instead a strong connection of
the case to the US. See Kiobel ibid.
21 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 16
November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3 (LOSC).
22 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities
in the Area, para. 201. Note that natural and juridical persons are eligible to carry out activities in the
Area, in accordance with Art. 153(2) LOSC, provided that they be either nationals of a state party or
effectively controlled by its nationals, and are sponsored by such state. When damage arises out of a
wrongful act in the conduct of the operations of such a contractor, as a result of its activity, its
responsibility or liability will be engaged in accordance with Art. 22 of the LOSC Annex III.
23 See the contribution by Karavias (2015), Section 3.2 on shared responsibility between a multinational
enterprise and the host state. MacLeod argues that the contractual relationship between the home and host
states and the private security corporation might be the only legal ground that can lead to the
responsibility of the latter, albeit in a domestic law setting, without, however, reflecting the shared nature
of the enterprise undertaken, see MacLeod (2015), Section 2.
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particular situations that have arisen in dispute-settlement. More specifically, the
contributors have been asked to identify new patterns in both recent practice and
literature of non-state actors being held co-responsible for their contributions to
harmful outcomes, as well as to reflect critically on the added value of a shared
responsibility approach when it comes to regulating the activities of non-state actors.
5 Cross-Cutting and Recurring Legal Questions
The question of sharing responsibility for harmful acts involving non-state actors
and states that is at the heart of this symposium is obviously wide and raises
different types of legal issues. Therefore, this question will be broken down into
three sub-issues, which will be addressed in what follows. These issues are
addressed in the contributions to this symposium, although these contributions do
not necessarily adopt the same structure. The three sub-questions pertain to the
relevance of shared responsibility stricto sensu, in the sense of responsibility for
internationally wrongful acts (Sect. 5.1); the possibility to litigate issues of shared
non-state actor responsibility in the courts, whether international or domestic ones
(Sect. 5.2); and the question of whether the classic responsibility re´gime is suited to
capture the specific challenges of non-state actors, or whether, instead, responsi-
bility, at least in the strict sense, should be abandoned in favour of an alternative and
more realistic approach that emphasises standard-setting (or ‘regulation’) and
accountability via supervisory mechanisms (Sect. 5.3).
5.1 Non-State Actor Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts
A key question is whether it is a useful heuristic device to examine the question of
responsibility of non-state actors—alone or shared with states—from the angle of
the traditional concepts and principles of responsibility. The practice in relation to
wrongful acts and/or harmful outcomes caused by non-state actors, as detailed in the
remainder of the symposium, provides little support for a transposition of the
concepts and principles of international responsibility to non-state actors. This
obviously already follows from the fact that, with the exception of armed opposition
groups, there are few obligations that directly bind non-state actors.24 Even
24 Armed groups, however, are bound by international humanitarian law, in particular Common Art. 3 of
the Geneva Conventions 1949 (Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 UNTS 85;
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287), and Art. 1(1) Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 8 June 1977, in force 7 December 1979, 1125
UNTS 609; see also the contribution by Bı´lkova´ (2015), Section 2.2. Terrorist groups for their part are
bound by a series of terrorism suppression conventions; see also the contribution by Trapp (2015),
Section 2. It is generally considered that corporations are not bound by international (human rights) law;
see Karavias (2015), Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Private security corporations are also not bound by
international law, see McLeod 2015, Section 2.
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assuming that non-state actors could be duty-bearers under international law whose
responsibility can be envisaged, a number of further questions arise.
One such question concerns the possibility of the transposition of rules of state
responsibility by analogy. This is not an easy operation and it would require some
serious fine-tuning of the ARSIWA if they were to be successfully applied, notably
in relation to principles of attribution.25
A related question is whether responsibility for wrongful conduct involving non-
state actors is to be assessed on the basis of independent acts of these actors, or rather
on the basis of a shared contribution to a single harmful outcome, with the actors’ acts
being dependent on each other for the outcome to materialise. In many situations, non-
state actors and states may separately contribute to, or aggravate, a single harmful
outcome. For instance, states may provide support to non-state actors, or non-state
actors may provide support to (aid/assist) states, in violation of international law, with
the supported actor then committing an internationally wrongful act (e.g., a violation
of international humanitarian law or human rights law, or a terrorist act) or causing
harm otherwise.26 Such separate action may also occur when states fail to take
sufficient measures to prevent harmful activity by non-state actors, e.g., when they
condone the presence of terrorists on their territory.27 Another example arises when
states fail to call non-state actors to account for wrongful acts committed or injuries
caused (e.g., by not living up to their duty to prosecute or extradite).28 In those
situations, the responsibility of non-state actors and states may be engaged on the
basis of discrete conduct. This is in line with some of the classic paradigms of the law
of international responsibility, which tend to isolate acts of different actors with a
view to holding them to account independently of each other.29
In other situations, it may be appropriate to adopt a perspective of joint action, in
which the various actors’ contributions may not be isolated from each other. One
can think here of an armed opposition group mounting a joint military operation
together with a state against another state in violation of the principle of non-
intervention, and/or causing civilian casualties in violation of the rules of
25 See notably Bı´lkova´ (2015), Section 2.
26 See in this respect ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, addressing the support which the United States
provided to non-state armed groups in Nicaragua at para. 116: ‘[The Court] takes the view that the
contras remain responsible for their acts, and that the United States is not responsible for the acts of the
contras, but for its own conduct vis-a`-vis Nicaragua, including conduct related to the acts of the contras.
What the Court has to investigate is not the complaints relating to alleged violations of humanitarian law
by the contras, regarded by Nicaragua as imputable to the United States, but rather unlawful acts for
which the United States may be responsible directly in connection with the activities of the contras’
(emphasis in the original). See further on the inferences for shared responsibility that could be drawn from
Nicaragua, as well as from the ICJ judgment in Bosnian Genocide for that matter: Bı´lkova´, Section 2.2.
See on shared responsibility arising as a result of corporations aiding and assisting states in committing
violations of international law: Karavias (2015), Sections 3.2, 4 and 5.
27 See however Trapp (2015), Section 3.2.1, arguing that ‘[s]uch states lack the general capacity,
resources or territorial control that is a factual pre-requisite for effective counter-terrorism measures’, and
instead suggesting in Section 3.2.2 a ‘sphere of influence’ approach to prevention.
28 See Trapp (2015), Section 3.3, in respect of terrorism.
29 Such a principle was affirmed and discussed by Roberto Ago in his third report on state responsibility,
see UN Doc. A/CN.4/246, Add.1–3 (1971). See generally Nollkaemper and Jacobs (2013).
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international humanitarian law.30 In this situation, there may be a single conduct
committed by multiple actors, resulting in a single injury. It could be submitted that
this conduct should technically be attributed to more than one actor (i.e., double or
multiple attribution), although such multiple attribution is rather rare in international
law, also in the state responsibility context.31 Leaving aside that option, the question
is whether it is conceptually helpful to consider such situations in terms of joint
responsibility, and what the implications of such responsibility would be, e.g., with
respect to the obligation to provide reparation.
5.2 Dispute-settlement
One must admit that in respect of non-state actors, discussions of shared
responsibility, and the consequences attached to it, are at first sight somewhat
theoretical, given the absence of international dispute-settlement mechanisms with
jurisdiction over non-state actors.32 As revamping the international judicial system is
not a realistic option, a more insightful avenue is to consider how existing dispute-
settlement mechanisms could be creatively used to determine questions, and
consequences, of shared responsibility involving non-state actors and other actors.
Such mechanisms are mainly found at the domestic level, as some non-state actors
have (domestic) legal personality, including the capacity to sue and be sued. Domestic
courts can then hold non-state actors responsible under international law, or under
(transnational) domestic law, for acts which they carried out together with other
actors, such as states. These courts may lack jurisdiction over the latter, however, for
instance because of applicable immunities. In a situation of apparent shared
responsibility, it may be necessary to consider domestic courts in connection with
dispute-settlement or compliance-monitoring mechanisms which may have jurisdic-
tion over the other actor(s) sharing responsibility with the non-state actor. By way of
example, domestic courts hearing cases against corporations that have assisted states
in the commission of wrongful acts may consider and perhaps even develop
30 See Bı´lkova´ (2015), Section 1.
31 See however State of the Netherlands v. Mustafic´ et al., ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9228 (6 September
2013); State of the Netherlands v. Hasan Nuhanovic´, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225 (6 September 2013).
The Court opined in this respect that Art. 48 of the Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations, ILC Report on the work of its sixty-third session, UNGAOR 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN
Doc. A/66/10 (2011) (ARIO)—which enshrines the principle that ‘[w]here an international organization
and one or more States or other international organizations are responsible for the same internationally
wrongful act, the responsibility of each State or organization may be invoked in relation to that act’—
‘expressly leaves open the possibility… of dual attribution to the international organization and the State
concerned’ and thus to ‘more than one State or organization being held responsible for the consequences
of an internationally wrongful act’ (para. 3.9.4). Contra: Nollkaemper PA, Jacobs D, Shared
Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework, SHARES Research Paper 03 (2011),
ACIL 2011–07 (revised version, May 2012), available at http://www.sharesproject.nl/wp-content/
uploads/2012/05/SHARES-RP-03-final.pdf, p. 111—(arguing that an international organisation and a
state can both be held responsible for the same wrongful act, but not on the basis of this act being
attributed to both of them, but rather on the basis of ‘parallel attribution based on independent acts’);
Advocate General’s advisory opinion in the same cases, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:BZ9228 (3 May 2013);
ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:BZ9225 (3 May 2013), para. 5.14. See also Messineo (2014), p. 60.
32 That is with the exception of the Deep Seabed Chamber of the LOSC, see Plakokefalos (2013).
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cooperative arrangements with international human rights supervisory bodies that
have jurisdiction over the state which was assisted by the corporation (such a body
could, e.g., open a proprio motu investigation into the state’s conduct).33
Alternatively, domestic court proceedings which result in a finding of the
responsibility of a non-state actor, e.g., of a terrorist actor, may contain a wealth of
information laying blame at the doorstep of another actor, e.g., a state supporting
terrorism.34 Such information may be used in successive litigation against the latter
in another forum. At any rate, at a diplomatic level it can provide evidence as to the
international responsibility of the state, which the latter—given the esteem in which
court decisions are typically held—cannot easily dismiss. Therefore, domestic
courts may want to avoid offering a truncated narrative in cases of apparent joint
responsibility. While they may have jurisdiction over only one actor involved, they
may want to anticipate that their findings can be used in other fora, and thus they
may, tentatively, identify the grounds on which the various actors may share
responsibility, as well as the extent to which they respectively contributed to the
eventual harm. Such a finding may not be binding on the mechanism hearing a
subsequent responsibility case against another actor involved, but at least it can
provide an authoritative point of reference.
5.3 The Turn to Standard-Setting and Accountability as an Alternative
to Responsibility
Analyses of shared responsibility in respect of non-state actors may not be limited to
merely operationalising shared responsibility for specific legal subjects. Instead,
they may unearth more fundamental questions as to the nature and limitations of
international responsibility. The difficulty of determining the responsibility of non-
state actors has, both in practice and in scholarship, led to a quest for alternatives.
Thinking out of the box may be even more relevant and insightful in respect of non-
state actors, since there are reasons for construing the nature of the latter as
fundamentally different from the states and international organisations for which the
international responsibility re´gime was originally devised. Non-state actors are
‘organisations’ that are not necessarily pursuing the public good. Furthermore, they
are incorporated under domestic law (e.g., corporations, including private security
corporations and non-governmental organisations), or not incorporated at all (e.g.,
armed groups). Often, they entertain non-horizontal relationships with other
international legal subjects (states and international organisations), due to de facto
power differences and the absence of recognised legal personality.35 Combined with
the difficulty to directly bind non-state actors under international law, the question
therefore arises whether the international legal responsibility re´gime as we know it
is well-suited to apply to them.
33 See notably Karavias (2015), Section 4 (arguing that domestic courts should take into consideration
findings of breach by human rights courts or treaty bodies).
34 See Trapp (2015), Section 2 in fine.
35 Note, however, that some non-state actors may rival states in terms of economic or military clout, e.g.,
major multinational corporations, or well-organised armed opposition groups.
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It is against this backdrop that contributors to this symposium issue have been
invited to reflect on possible alternative regimes for (shared) responsibility
involving specific non-state actors. Almost all authors have considered abandoning
the dogmatic focus on responsibility for internationally wrongful acts as a means to
regulate joint action involving organised non-state actors. Thereby, they recognise
that in light of the difficulties to reform (or transpose) the existing law of
international responsibility, a more promising—and probably realistic—route to
take may be to embrace a broader accountability approach.
One such alternative, that nonetheless stays close to another paradigm of
international law, is suggested in the contribution of Veronika Bı´lkova´. She
considers the application of a liability approach that could offer remedies to victims
for injurious non-state action that falls short of a violation of an international
obligation.36 The liability approach, however, is beset by similar problems as the
responsibility approach: it remains elusive how precisely to conceive of joint
liability, and how to address the temporary nature of some non-state actors.
More promising seems to be the standard-setting (or regulatory) approach, with
advocates strengthening standards and commitments by both non-state actors and
states, coupled with supervisory mechanisms. Such standards could be unilaterally
adopted by a non-state actor or jointly developed and overseen by non-state actors
and other actors, and are aimed at preventing harm from occurring and making non-
state actors accountable. They are not necessarily legally binding. This is a route
that is already being taken with respect to the activities of multinational
corporations, private security companies, and armed groups, as is illustrated by
the contributions of Markos Karavias, Sorcha MacLeod, and Veronika Bı´lkova´.
It is important to stress here that such perspectives are not necessarily meant to be
a substitute for a responsibility regime. After all, the substitution of an ex post
regime of responsibility for breach of ex ante assumed legally binding obligations
by a regime that relies on the ex ante assumption of non-binding, non-legal
obligations, seems difficult to justify. The point made here is different: if there are
no primary obligations to begin with, a regime of responsibility simply cannot
apply. Moreover, even where primary obligations exist, it would be difficult to see
how the ARSIWA can be transposed so as to accommodate the peculiarities arising
out of the nature of non-state actors (i.e., their lack of hierarchical organisation, and
their temporary existence). Therefore, what is suggested is an ex ante regime of
prevention that seeks to regulate the conduct of non-state actors without imposing
binding international obligations on them. This regime differs from the one
envisaged in the ARSIWA, as it provides yardsticks for the monitoring of non-state
actors’ compliance with non-binding obligations they have assumed.
Standard-setting is not apposite to every non-state actor, however. For instance,
as Kimberley Trapp argues in her contribution, as terrorists deliberately defy the
international legal order, they have no interest whatsoever in self-regulation.37 At
36 Bı´lkova´ (2015), Section 3.1.
37 Trapp (2015), Section 1.
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the same time, states that may be involved in harbouring, aiding and assisting, or
directly participating in terrorist operations are already bound by primary
obligations. The challenge is to ensure that states assume their responsibility to
comply with the obligations which they have set for themselves, and to ensure that
the existing law is applied expansively, so that states do not get away with
supporting or condoning terrorism.38 In contrast, a turn to standard-setting is clearly
discernible with respect to the activities of transnational corporations, armed groups
and private security companies.
Standard-setting and supervisory mechanisms perform two distinct functions.
Standard-setting aims at imposing a normative framework on non-state actors that
moves away from the context of, strictly speaking, binding obligations. Supervision
(or ‘compliance-monitoring’) allows for determinations of accountability, short of
responsibility. Within this latter concept, various forms may be distinguished.
Supervision can refer to monitoring the compliance of actors with binding
obligations. This voluntary move away from the classic responsibility re´gime does
not imply, however, that non-compliance cannot at the same time be a breach of an
international obligation leading to international responsibility proper. Compliance-
monitoring can also function as a non-legally binding test of the performance of the
actor in question against the observance of a given target (apart from legally binding
obligations).39 It is useful to keep the two concepts apart.
A host of standard-setting and compliance-monitoring initiatives relevant to non-
state actors are in the process of being developed.40 These initiatives often involve
multiple stakeholders, including non-state actors, states, and international organisa-
tions, in acknowledgement of the fact that multiple actors can cause harm, either
through direct commission or a failure to act. Interestingly, the term ‘shared
responsibility’ has been used in this context, not to denote shared responsibility for
internationally wrongful acts, but rather to denote a—not necessarily legal—shared
duty to put in place due diligence-based mechanisms to prevent violations, and to
provide for grievance mechanisms in case of violations. Due diligence in this
context does not denote the classic notion that speaks to the nature of the primary
obligation. It is used as a convenient notion of a general—again not necessarily
legal—duty of vigilance or care. In particular, the UN Special Representative for
Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, John Ruggie, recognised ‘that some
business and human rights challenges require multi-stakeholder responses, [by
allocating] shared responsibilities … within complex collaborative networks that
can include any combination of host and home states, corporations, civil society
38 Thus, Trapp suggests using the ‘overall control’ standard for attribution of terrorist conduct to states
under Art. 8 ARSIWA, as well as a ‘sphere of influence’ responsibility concept inspired by the ICJ’s
judgment in the Bosnian Genocide case. Also, she recommends a strict construction of aut dedere aut
judicare obligations in anti-terrorism conventions to prevent states from getting away with not
prosecuting or extraditing presumed terrorists (Trapp 2015).
39 See Shelton (2003).
40 See notably: Marx et al. (2012); Peters et al. (2009). For a detailed account of standard-setting and the
prospects of its internalisation by the private security corporations, see MacLeod (2015), Sections 3 and
4.1.
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actors, industry associations, international institutions and investors groups’.41 This
conceptualisation of shared responsibility echoes the discussion regarding various
(international) actors’ responsibility to protect vulnerable populations from core
international crimes.42
The emphasis of this shared responsibility concept does not so much lie on the
ex post facto undoing or repairing of consequences of internationally wrongful acts
(although this may be part of it), but rather on the a priori joint establishment of
acceptable standards of conduct, and an assessment of the conduct of non-state
actors, whether or not in conjunction with states, against such standards. For
instance, corporations, via hybrid multi-stakeholder initiatives or transnational
private regulation—and often in cooperation with, or supported by states—develop
standards and set up accountability mechanisms to protect global public goods that
may be affected by corporate activity.43 Armed groups, in cooperation with, or at
the behest of, non-governmental organisations44 or international organisations,45
commit themselves to upholding international humanitarian law and human rights
law through ‘deeds of commitment’ or peace treaties,46 and are, at least in part,
subject to international supervisory processes.47
It is of note that the commitments by various actors and categories are not
communicating vessels: the responsibility assumed by one actor does not diminish
the responsibility assumed by another. Being of a different nature and independent
of each other, these responsibilities should be seen as complementary and mutually
reinforcing. The Commentary to the Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights indeed suggests with respect to the allocation of responsibilities between
corporations and states: ‘The [corporate] responsibility to respect human rights is a
global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they
operate. It exists independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfill their
own human rights obligations, and does not diminish those obligations.’48 This
principle ensures that one actor does not shift the burden or the blame to another
actor.
41 Cf. Ruggie J., ‘Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and
Accountability for Corporate Acts’, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (9 February 2007), para. 53, see also paras.
52–62; Ruggie J., Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Addendum, ‘Summary of five multi-
stakeholder consultations’, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add.1 (23 April 2008), see section VI (Improving the
human rights performance of business through multi-stakeholder initiatives).
42 See for the multitude of (international) institutions’ role in this respect: Zyberi (2013); Hoffmann et al.
(2012).
43 See Cafaggi (2012).
44 See notably the Swiss non-governmental organisation Geneva Call, a ‘neutral and impartial non-
governmental organization dedicated to promoting respect by armed non-State actors (ANSAs) for
international humanitarian norms in armed conflict’, see http://www.genevacall.org/who-we-are/.
45 See, e.g., Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups
(Paris Principles), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), February 2007.
46 See on standard-setting: Roberts & Sivakumaran (2012).
47 See on enhancing and enforcing compliance: Ryngaert and Vande Meulebroucke (2011).
48 ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘‘Protect,
Respect and Remedy’’ Framework’, Commentary to Principle 11.
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A major challenge facing these multi-stakeholders’ standard-setting and
supervisory initiatives pertains to participation and, more broadly, legitimacy:
they are legitimised on the basis of shared responsibility and are self-policed.49 In
response to demands for a better participation of (public interest) stakeholders,
states and international organisations may want to assume their ‘shared’
responsibility—which is derived, as far as human rights are concerned, from
their ‘duty to protect’—by facilitating and orchestrating non-state actor standard-
setting and compliance-monitoring.50 In some situations and in relation to some
non-state actors, they can do so by means of market-based mechanisms, e.g.,
public procurement, financial reporting, and trade measures,51 or by more forceful
measures such as sanctions.52
6 The Structure of This Symposium
Structure is always a matter of choice. The editors have assumed that different types
of non-state actors do not necessarily yield the application of a similar regime of
responsibility. Therefore, this symposium is articulated around the four main
organised non-state actors. Questions of shared responsibility will be successively
examined in connection with armed groups (Veronika Bı´lkova´); multinational
corporations (Markos Karavias); private security corporations (Sorcha MacLeod);
and terrorist groups (Kimberley Trapp). By virtue of this actor-based classification,
the contributions demonstrate that the question of shared responsibility between
non-state actors and states differs from one type of organised non-state actor to the
other, but may also vary in accordance with the type of their interaction with states.
Although their individual structure varies, the four contributions to this
symposium all consider, both empirically and theoretically, each of the three
above-mentioned sub-questions: the relevance of responsibility in the traditional
sense of the term, dispute-settlement, and (apart from the contribution on non-state
terrorist actors by Kimberly Trapp) the turn to standard-setting as an alternative to
responsibility. In the contribution of Sorcha MacLeod on private security
corporations, the turn to standard-setting occupies a central place.53
49 See on the necessity of engaging organised non-state actors regarding shared responsibility issues:
Ruggie (2004).
50 See Abbott and Snidal (2009).
51 See on how these market-based mechanisms have been and can be resorted to: Ryngaert (2015).
52 A fine example of such a sanctions regime is offered by the UN Security Council’s practice of
imposing sanctions on persons who are presumed to support terrorists, on armed groups active in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Darfur (notably the Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctions on
the basis of UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999)), and on persons who violate the rights of the child in armed
conflicts, see UN Doc. S/RES/1493 (2003); UN Doc. S/RES/1521 (2003); UN Doc. S/RES/1552 (2004);
UN Doc S/RES/1556 (2004); and UN Doc. S/RES/1596 (2005). Note that on closer inspection, the
relevant resolutions oblige states to enforce these sanctions; they may not impose direct obligations on the
armed groups themselves. From the perspective of the targeted person, these sanctions are domestic rather
than international, and their legality may be challenged on the basis of domestic law.
53 MacLeod (2015), Section 3.
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7 Lessons Learnt and the Way Forward
From the four contributions, different types of interactions between non-state actors
and states could be gleaned, as well as, corresponding to this, different ways in
which non-state actors and states, either jointly or independently, contribute to the
same harm. Non-state actors may team up with states to bring about a prohibited or
harmful outcome, either by taking joint action, or by one actor aiding and assisting
the other. An example of the former is a military operation conducted jointly by
state forces and a private military company, resulting in violations of humanitarian
law; an example of the latter is a multinational corporation giving logistical support
to a repressive state. Short of teaming up with each other, states and non-state actors
may also take concurrent yet uncoordinated action contributing to the same harm.
This may occur where a state or international organisation passively stands by when
an armed group commits atrocities or launches terrorist attacks, or where a state
fails to prosecute or extradite presumed terrorists present on its territory. In all these
cases, shared (joint/concurrent/cumulative) responsibility for international law
violations could potentially ensue.
Such a shared responsibility regime involving non-state actors and states could
theoretically be based on the somewhat more mature shared responsibility regime
implicit in the ARSIWA and further developed by scholars of state responsibility.
The contributors to this symposium have seen some potential in this transposition,
and have notably drawn attention to the application of the regimes of attribution of
conduct and attribution of responsibility (the latter denoting aiding and assisting,
direction and control, and coercion) to the interaction between non-state actors and
states.54 Ultimately, however, most of them have proved to be somewhat sceptical
of the prospects of transposing the state responsibility regime to non-state actors, on
a number of grounds. They have pointed out that an international responsibility
regime can only work adequately if its addressees are bound by primary norms of
international law in the first place55; in respect of non-state actors, which largely
lack international legal personality, or at least legal capacity, this may indeed be an
insurmountable challenge. The authors have signalled the dearth of dispute-
settlement mechanisms competent to establish shared responsibility between non-
state actors and states—while nevertheless highlighting potential synergies between
various mechanisms.56 And they have drawn attention to the incommensurability of
non-state actors and states; the peculiar nature of the former—loosely organised,
temporary, diverse, illegitimate, or even outright criminal—may arguably render a
responsibility paradigm for non-state-state interactions inappropriate.57
54 See Bı´lkova´ (2015), Sections 2.1 and 2.2; Karavias (2015), Section 3.2; Trapp (2015), Sections 2 and
3.1. This is not the case in MacLeod (2015), see Section 1.
55 See notably Bı´lkova´ (2015) and Karavias (2015).
56 Trapp (2015), Section 2 in fine; Karavias (2015), Section 4.
57 Bı´lkova´ (2015), Section 2 in fine; MacLeod (2015), Sections 1, 2. The peculiar character of terrorist
groups has led Trapp even to focus her contribution on the shared responsibility of states and individual
terrorists rather than of terrorist groups. See for her justification see footnote 9 of her contribution (Trapp
2015).
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Given the limitations of a formal responsibility regime, three of the four authors
have explored, and ultimately favoured, albeit cautiously, the standard-setting
approach to shared responsibility, the traits of which have been set out at length
earlier in this contribution. Such an approach has undeniable benefits, as it ensures
ex ante commitments to standards ‘owned’ by the various actors involved, via codes
of conduct or unilateral declarations. But its constraints are undeniable as well. As a
commitment to these standards, and openness to compliance-monitoring, are in
essence voluntary,58 there is no guarantee that non-state actors and states will
embrace them, or comply with them. Given these limitations, an ex post formal
responsibility approach may suddenly look more attractive.
At the end of the day, the choice faced by international lawyers confronted with
questions of accountability for the conduct of non-state actors in conjunction with
states remains the very same choice between two opposite conceptual options. On
the one hand, one can choose to transpose to such questions the mainstream
categories inherited from a time when both international law and the world looked
(and were looked at) different(ly). On the other hand, one can decide to emancipate
oneself from these categories—be it responsibility, wrongfulness, attribution or
even legal personality—and change the paradigm from which such contemporary
issues must be addressed. Should one choose for the latter option, and its reformist
ambition, one should do so with the awareness that international law is always
reformed from within unless one decides to address questions of the shared
responsibility of non-state actors from the vantage point of another discipline. It
cannot be excluded, as some of the following contributions show, that such a move
away from international law itself may sometimes be the only possible route. Yet, as
all the following contributions—directly or indirectly—demonstrate, it seems that
international lawyers will continue to embrace both approaches, which, to some
extent, can be envisaged simultaneously without contradicting one another.59
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